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New Data for Answering Old 
Questions Regarding Employee 
Stock Options
Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
4.1    Background
An employee stock option is the right an employee has to buy a share 
of stock at a set price at some time in the future, subject to vesting and 
other provisions. The dramatic growth in the use of stock options in the 
past decade (Hall and Murphy 2003), new Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB 2004) standards on how to account for stock options in ﬁ  rm 
balance sheets, new disclosure requirements for highly paid executives in 
U.S. ﬁ  rms, and a growing debate over how to handle stock options in na-
tional accounts (in the United States and elsewhere) have sparked consider-
able interest in the study of stock options in recent years.
In keeping with the tradition of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (CRIW), 
this chapter aims to provide a review and update on some important ques-
tions in stock options research and practice, explore a variety of new and 
interesting data sets for the careful and credible study of employee stock 
options, discuss implications of options in the national accounts, and pro-
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vide some new empirical evidence on the value of options to employees using 
a decade of data from a large U.S. ﬁ  rm.
There are a host of reasons why learning more about stock options is 
important for ﬁ  rms, employees, and public policymakers. First, over the past 
twenty years, there has been dramatic growth in the use of stock options for 
senior-  level executives and, beginning in the mid-  1990s, substantial growth 
in the use of options for nonexecutive employees that was only partially 
dampened by the market adjustment in 2001. For example, among pub-
licly traded ﬁ  rms, Hall and Murphy (2003) report that option grants to 
managers and employees who are not among the top ﬁ  ve highest paid in 
the ﬁ  rm has grown from less than 85 percent of the total options granted 
to employees in the mid-  1990s to over 90 percent by 2002. While there is 
some evidence that options to nonexecutives have become less common in 
recent years, they clearly remain an important dimension of compensation 
in many ﬁ  rms. Research on options may both help researchers understand 
why ﬁ  rms grant options and inform ﬁ  rms about how they should evaluate 
their employee stock option policies and practices. Whenever a ﬁ  rm decides 
to grant options, it must decide whether it is better oﬀ granting the options or 
some alternative form of compensation. In order to do this appropriately a 
ﬁ  rm must know (a) how employees value the options relative to other forms 
of compensation, (b) the costs of the options to the ﬁ  rm, and (c) the relative 
incentive eﬀects of the options (e.g., do they inﬂ  uence the employees to work 
harder)? Even if the options “cost” the ﬁ  rm more than other forms of pay, 
the ﬁ  rm may still want to provide them if incentive eﬀects or other beneﬁ  ts 
are suﬃciently large.
A second reason research on options is important is that it may provide 
insight into the widespread debate about the appropriate method of estimat-
ing the cost and value of options to ﬁ  rms. Although there are many strongly 
held opinions and new FASB regulations on how ﬁ  rms should expense 
options, there is no consensus on a theoretical model and empirical method 
for estimating employee stock option costs to the ﬁ  rm. Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1973) developed a widely accepted model used for pric-
ing market traded options for risk- neutral, diversiﬁ  ed investors that has been 
used (with modiﬁ  cations) successfully for more than three decades. While 
the same techniques have been extended to consider the value of options to 
employees and their cost to the ﬁ  rm, many have pointed out that the value 
of an option to an employee, and its cost to the ﬁ  rm may be considerably 
diﬀerent than the value to an outside investor (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and 
Verecchia 1991). Using this idea, Hall and Murphy (2002) have run simula-
tions of option values to risk averse senior managers that show employees 
value options at a level that is substantially less than the Black- Scholes value 
and the cost of the option to the ﬁ  rm.
Understanding the cost of options to the ﬁ  rm may also provide insight 
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estimates of employee compensation. Proper measurement of stock options 
is important for the valid measurement of the national accounts since, as 
of March 2003, “8 percent of private industry workers had access to stock 
options” (Schildkraut 2004,1). Current work on this topic by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) is investigating major data collection, conceptual 
and practical measurement, and timing issues (Moylan 2007).
Stock option data are not carefully collected in many common data 
sources in the United States. For example, the National Compensation Sur-
vey (NCS) considered the incidence and provisions of stock option plans in 
a 1999 pilot survey, perhaps with intent to further collect the information 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2000; Crimmel and Schildkraut 1999; 
Crimmel and Schildkraut 2001). But the BLS has not further pursued this 
path, in part given that there is not a standard costing method that would 
allow employers to report costs at an occupational level. The NCS does col-
lect information on access to stock options (BLS 2007).
The ﬁ  rst section of this chapter brieﬂ  y describes a typical stock option 
grant and the famous Black-  Scholes option pricing formula for valuing 
publicly traded stock options. We then discuss why the value of employee 
(nonmarket tradable) options may diﬀer from the valuation of market trad-
able options. We will also discuss how these alternative valuations relate to 
the controversy regarding the treatment of stock options in the national 
accounts. The second section details a set of data sources on stock options 
within the United States and internationally. We also consider how newer 
data could improve what we know in the national accounts. The chapter 
concludes with a case study of employee valuation of stock options in a large 
nonmanufacturing ﬁ  rm. We examine the value employees place on stock 
options using data from multiple large grants of stock options to a large set 
of managerial and professional employees in a multibillion dollar U.S. non-
manufacturing ﬁ  rm. We show that employee exercise decisions are broadly 
consistent with employee risk aversion and inconsistent with the risk neutral 
valuation of market-  traded options that is predicted by the Black-  Scholes 
model for market- traded options. Our hope is that our work is a useful guide 
to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners interested in stock options.
4.2    Theoretical  Perspective
This section has four main goals. First, we deﬁ  ne an employee stock option 
grant and provide some context. Second, we describe the Black-  Scholes 
method for valuing publicly traded options. Third, we describe why the value 
employees place on stock options may diﬀer from the well-  known Black- 
Scholes value. Fundamental to this discussion are the diﬀerences between 
market tradable options, for which the Black- Scholes option pricing formula 
was created, and employee stock options. Finally we discuss implications of 
alternative valuations for the national accounts.152        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
4.2.1    Deﬁ  ning Stock Options
An option to buy a share of stock at a set price (the strike or exercise price) 
can be executed by an employee after the option is held for a period of time 
known as the vesting period. Employee stock options typically vest within 
one to three years, are forfeited if the employee leaves the ﬁ  rm, and expire 
(typically) ten years after the grant date. Shorter vesting periods and option 
terms are common among high-  technology ﬁ  rms, and, on some occasions, 
they gradually vest (e.g., one- third of the options vest at the end of year one, 
one-  third vest at the end of year two, and one-  third vest at the end of year 
three). Finally, employees cannot sell their options to a third party. This 
limitation ensures that until the options are exercised, the options continue 
to tie worker compensation to ﬁ  rm outcomes.
4.2.2      Black-  Scholes Method of Valuing Publicly Traded Options
A discussion about the value of options to employees begins with the pio-
neering work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), who describe 
the value to diversiﬁ  ed investors of market traded stock options. The fa-
mous diagram shown in ﬁ  gure 4.1 summarizes the basic relationship between 
the Black- Scholes value (BSV) of an option to buy a share of stock at a ﬁ  xed 
price in the future (a call option), the ﬁ  rm’s stock price, and the option’s 
exercise price. The kinked intrinsic value line equals max([SPt –  EP], 0), where 
SPt is the price of the ﬁ  rm’s stock in period t, and EP is the strike or exercise 
price of the stock option and corresponds to the payoﬀ that could be made 
by immediately exercising the option and then selling the acquired share 
at the ﬁ  rm’s stock price. The curved line in the ﬁ  gure is the BSV and is the 
predicted price that an unexercised option could be bought or sold for based 
on the Black-  Scholes theory. The BSV is a function of six variables—the 
risk-  free interest rate, the expiration date of the option, the variance in the 
ﬁ  rm’s stock returns, the ﬁ  rm’s dividend rate, the option exercise price, and 
the current stock price. Figure 4.2 shows the BSV values for an option with 
an exercise price of $10 that expires in 10, 5, and 0.5 years for a “typi-
cal” ﬁ  rm.1 When the stock price is $10 and the option expires in ten years, 
the BSV estimate of the market value of the option is $5.57. Thus, even 
though a proﬁ  t cannot be made by immediately exercising the option on 
the grant date, it has signiﬁ  cant value because of the expectations of inves-
tors that at the end of the ten-  year period a signiﬁ  cant proﬁ  t is expected 
(but not guaranteed) because of the expected positive per-  period returns 
over the option’s term. The market value of the option on the option grant 
increases as the duration of the option increases because the distribution 
of returns on the expiration date have a larger mean and variance as the 
1. The standard deviation of the ﬁ  rm’s returns over a year is .3, no dividends are paid by the 
ﬁ  rm, and the risk-  free interest rate is 6 percent.Fig. 4.1    Black-  Scholes value and the intrinsic value of an option
Fig. 4.2    Black-  Scholes value and the intrinsic value of an option and the value of 
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option’s duration increases.2 If the option shown in ﬁ  gure 4.2 expires in 
ﬁ  ve years, its value at a $10 stock price is $3.80, and, if the option expires 
in six months, its market value is $.99 at a $10 stock price. The relationship 
between the stock price and BSV for options with these terms is shown 
in ﬁ  gure 4.2.
An important result shown by Black, Scholes, and Merton is that the 
market value of an option depends on the riskless rate of return and does 
not depend on the ﬁ  rm’s expected return, which includes a ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c risk 
premium. The prediction that owners of market traded options can only 
expect to earn the riskless rate of return by holding the option is because 
investors can eliminate the risk that the option will be worthless when it 
expires because the stock price is less than the exercise price with a hedging 
strategy. For example, an investor could buy a “put” option that gives the 
owner the right to sell a share of stock at $10 per share in period T. This put 
option will pay a proﬁ  t to its owner if the call option is “underwater” (SPT 
  EP). Owning this put ensures the investor will make a proﬁ  t at time T no 
matter what the stock price happens to be on the expiration day. While ﬁ  rms 
discourage employees from owning put options because these options are a 
“bet against the company” and earn money only if the ﬁ  rm’s stock price falls, 
for outside investors this example illustrates a simple way of eliminating the 
risk associated from owning a call option. The ability of investors to hedge 
risk means competitive market pressures cause options prices to converge 
to a price that earns only a riskless rate of return.
More formally, the Black-  Scholes option pricing formula is
BSV   (SP) 
ln(SP/ EP)    (rf    2/ 2)t
   
 t   
    (EP)e( rft)  
ln(SP/  EP)   (rf    2/ 2)t   1
    
 t  ,
where rf is the risk- free rate of interest,   is the standard deviation of returns 
for the underlying stock, t is time in years until the option expires, and   is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution function. The model assumes 
the ﬁ  rm’s stock returns are normally distributed and uncorrelated from one 
period to the next. The assumption that returns are normally distributed 
means the price of a riskless asset in T periods is drawn from a log-  normal 
price distribution. As the option expiration date approaches, the Black- 
Scholes line shifts toward the intrinsic value line because the chance of draw-
ing a “large” positive return from the return distribution on the expiration 
date declines.
2. Because the terminal stock price distribution is log-  normally distributed, the expected 
price at the expiration date is a function of both the mean and variance of the per- period return. 
As we explain shortly, the per-  period return investors of market traded options expect to earn 
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4.2.3      Why the Value of Employee Options May 
Diverge from the Black-  Scholes Value
An important prediction of the Black-  Scholes model is that a diversiﬁ  ed 
investor will never exercise the right to buy a share of stock until the moment 
before it expires because, as ﬁ  gure 4.2 shows, at any earlier date the expected 
gain from holding the option until the expiration date is greater than the 
proﬁ  t that can be made by immediately exercising it. The expectation of 
a positive return between now and the expiration date means the Black- 
Scholes value is greater than the proﬁ  t that could be made by immediately 
exercising the option and receiving the option’s intrinsic value, (SPt –   EP). 
Therefore, the Black- Scholes model predicts that prior to the expiration date, 
an investor will sell an option rather than exercise it if they wish to convert 
an option to cash because the BSV, the sale price, is greater than (SPt –   EP).
The Black-  Scholes model predicts that market traded options held by 
diversiﬁ  ed investors will rarely be exercised early because options can almost 
always be sold for more than the option’s intrinsic value (stock price –   exer-
cise price).3 The Black-  Scholes model makes no prediction at all about how 
long the owner of a market traded option will own an option; it only predicts 
an option will be sold rather than exercised if its owner wants to liquidate 
his or her position prior to the expiration date. “Early” exercise behavior 
by employees occurs because they cannot sell their options, and their only 
choice during the term of the option is between exercising the option or 
holding the option for another period.
For some time, researchers have noted that the value employees place on 
employee stock options is likely to be diﬀerent from the value diversiﬁ  ed 
investors place on market tradable options. The major piece of empirical 
evidence cited to support this conclusion is the observation that employees 
frequently exercise employee stock options “early” or well before the option’s 
expiration date (Huddart and Lang 1996; Carpenter 1998). In the ﬁ  rm we 
study in section 4.4, 86 percent of employees exercised their options prior 
to the month before the options expired, and half of the sample exercised 
some of their options at least twenty- seven months prior to the option’s expi-
ration date.4 Lambert, Larcker, and Verecchia (1991) who, among others, 
argue that because employees are not risk neutral, are heavily invested in 
their ﬁ  rm (ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c human capital and deferred compensation), and 
may face liquidity constraints, they are likely to value employee options in 
their ﬁ  rm at a level lower than the Black- Scholes value and may also exercise 
their options earlier than predicted by Black-  Scholes. Simulation work by 
3. If ﬁ  rm dividends are suﬃciently high, there may be a date prior to the option’s expiration 
date when it is optimal to exercise an option early. This explanation cannot account for wide-
spread exercise behavior over the term of the option and after the vesting date.
4. These data are for the ﬁ  rst large employee stock option grant awards made to the middle- 
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Hall and Murphy (2002) shows that, conditional on a set of assumptions 
about risk aversion and the wealth they hold in ﬁ  rm stock, executives valued 
options at a level signiﬁ  cantly less than the Black-  Scholes value for market 
tradable options and exercised “early” to lock in gains from large stock price 
increases and diversify their portfolio. Contrary to Black-  Scholes, Heath, 
Huddart, and Lang (1999) ﬁ  nd that employees tend to exercise options when 
the ﬁ  rm’s stock price exceeds a target or referent price based on recent stock 
price highs.5
It must certainly be true that for those employees who exercise their options 
prior to the expiration date, the value they place on holding the option is 
less than the option’s BSV. Because the BSV of an option is greater than 
the option’s intrinsic value and an employee will exercise an option when the 
proﬁ  t from exercising early (the option’s intrinsic value) is greater than the 
value of holding the option, then the value of holding the option must be 
less than BSV when employees exercise their options. This result, however, 
does not say anything about the value of the options held by employees who 
have not yet exercised their options. While the diﬀerences between market 
traded options and employee stock options discussed earlier predicts the 
value of options held by employees is less than BSV, evidence of early exer-
cise behavior by employees only shows employees who do not exercise their 
options value the options at an amount greater than the option’s intrinsic 
value. The decision by an employee to continue to hold their options does 
not say anything about the value of the options relative to their BSV. Because 
employees cannot sell their options or use the options as collateral to bor-
row money, they have no market signals that could inform them of the value 
outside investors would place on their options.
The observation that employees frequently exercise employee stock 
options “early” compared to the Black- Scholes prediction for market traded 
options reﬂ  ects the fact that employees cannot sell the options they receive 
from their employer and must exercise the options if they wish to liquidate 
their position to diversify their portfolio or meet a household demand for 
cash. This feature of employee stock options implies information about an 
option’s value to an employee is revealed each period by observing whether 
a vested option is exercised. If an option is not exercised in a period, then 
the value to the employee of holding the option and reserving the right to 
exercise it in a later period is greater than the value from immediately exercis-
ing the option and receiving the option’s intrinsic value. On the other hand, 
when an employee exercises an option, we know the value of holding the 
option another period is less than what is gained by exercising the option and 
receiving a payment equal to the stock price minus the exercise price. Thus, 
the decision to exercise immediately or hold an option for at least another 
5. Because an employee must typically forfeit her options if she leaves the ﬁ  rm, early exercise 
decisions may also be caused by voluntary or involuntary employee turnover (Carpenter 1998).New Data for Answering Old Questions    1 5 7
period is an indicator of the current value to an employee of holding the 
option relative to the option’s intrinsic value.
One important implication of the preceding prediction is that variation 
in the length of time until employees exercise their options reﬂ  ects hetero-
geneity in the value employees place on holding their options for another 
period. This heterogeneity in the value of an employee stock option could 
reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in turnover intentions because employees must typically 
forfeit their employee stock options when they leave the ﬁ  rm. It may also 
reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in household risk aversion, the eﬀects of binding liquid-
ity constraints, or diﬀerent predictions about the future stock price of the 
ﬁ  rm. More risk-  averse employees may exercise early to “lock in” proﬁ  ts 
(Hall and Murphy 2002), and the inability of employees to borrow against 
their employee stock options may cause some employees to exercise options 
to meet family ﬁ  nancial commitments (buying a house, college tuition, or 
unanticipated health care expenditures). While these same sources of hetero-
geneity also characterize owners of market traded options, because Black- 
Scholes predicts owners of market traded options can sell and hedge their 
options, market traded options are identically valued (conditional on the six 
variables identiﬁ  ed in the preceding), regardless of the risk preferences and 
liquidity constraints of their owners. Thus, heterogeneity in exercise times is 
strong evidence that Black- Scholes does not measure the value of employee 
stock options to employees.
4.2.4      Stock Options, National Accounts, and How Valuation Matters
Accounting for stock options in the United States, National Economic 
Accounts poses a variety of diﬃcult issues.6 One problem is that there are, 
in fact, two types of employee stock options; incentive stock options (ISO) 
and nonqualiﬁ  ed stock options (NSO). Incentive stock options are not 
deductible for the employer or to the employee. However, when the stock is 
sold, the diﬀerence between the exercise price and the stock price is taxed 
as a capital gain for the individual (Moylan 2007). The NSOs are much 
more common and have diﬀerent tax implications for employees and ﬁ  rms. 
When an employee exercises an NSO, he or she must pay income tax on 
the diﬀerence between the stock price and the exercise price just as if that 
compensation had been paid in cash. The ﬁ  rm can count a tax deduction of 
the same magnitude at the same time.
Collecting options data for the national accounts is very diﬃcult.7 Given 
recent advances in the disclosure of employee equity awards, including stock 
and employee stock options, through the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Web site, we could imagine that collecting timely data is now easier than 
6. As pointed out in Lequiller (n.d.), this is also a problem is many other countries.
7. The Employment Cost Index, another important government statistic, does not include 
compensation in the form of stock options (Ruser 2001).158        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
at any time in the past. However, there are a series of barriers in consider-
ing the valuation of options in the national accounts, even with access to 
better data. Carol Moylan carefully outlines many of the important issues 
with the treatment of employee stock options in the U.S. national accounts 
(Moylan 2007).
One of the issues is that of timing. Cynthia Glassman, undersecretary 
for economic aﬀairs in the economic and statistics administration of the 
commerce department, noted (in a paper from the 2008 Allied Social Sci-
ences Association [ASSA] meetings), “proceeds from the exercise of stock 
options are included in compensation estimates for the quarter in which 
exercise occurs, and the proceeds are excluded from corporate proﬁ  ts for the 
same quarter. This means that stock option compensation is not recognized 
for some time—possibly years after employees actually receive the option 
grants . . . It also means that any divergence between accounting and tax 
proﬁ  ts creates a headache for BEA . . .” (Glassmam 2008, 65). Note also 
that the BEA does not produce a single quarterly Gross Domestic Income 
(GDI) estimate but many “vintages” of GDI estimates for each quarter. 
This “reﬂ  ects a compromise between providing timely estimates based on 
less-  than-  complete data and providing increasingly accurate estimates with 
lags that reﬂ  ect the availability of better and more complete data” (Glassman 
2008). Another issue discussed by Moylan (2007) is that it is unclear when 
to count the compensation as earnings—at the time of the grant or the time 
of the exercise of the option.
Moylan (2007) carefully describes that stock options do have value and 
should be treated as a form of compensation. One problem is when to count 
the compensation. Some argue that options should be counted as compen-
sation at the time of the grant and not at the time of exercise as they are 
currently counted in the national accounts.8 A diﬃculty with this view as 
pointed out by many is that employee options are subject to vesting, and, in 
a sense, the compensation is not earned until after vesting has occurred. So, 
therefore, perhaps the options should count as compensation at the time of 
vesting or some time between the grant date and vesting. After vesting, the 
gains from options could be thought of as a type of capital gain and, there-
fore, may no longer be considered compensation but as investment income. 
(Eurostat n.d.; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002). Therefore, there is 
diﬃculty, from a theoretical point of view, about whether stock options are 
a form of pay, an investment, or a combination of the two.
Moylan (2008) notes that “under most UI laws, wages and salaries include 
bonuses, tips, the cash value of meals and lodging provided by the employer, 
8. The discussion in the text is focused on options in the national accounts. This should not be 
confused with recent Financial Accounting Standards Board changes that now require ﬁ  rms to 
expense (and disclose in ﬁ  nancial statements) options at the time they are granted. This diﬀers 
from the tax treatment of options and from the national accounts practice of recognizing 
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the gain on the employee exercise of certain stock options, and employee 
contributions to certain deferred compensation plans” (9). She and others 
(e.g., McIntosh n.d.) note that in calculating compensation for the national 
accounts, the BEA assumes that compensation includes the exercise of 
NSOs but not ISOs. One problem, however, is that “there is evidence that 
some states are inconsistent in their coverage” (Moylan 2007, 2). Also, and 
as noted by Glassman (2008), the BLS quarterly census of employment and 
wages (QCEW) are reported with a lag of ﬁ  ve months.
One reason properly accounting for options in the National Accounts 
is extremely diﬃcult is the diﬀerence in accounting and tax treatment of 
stock options in the United States. For many years, there was a “discon-
nect” between the valuation of options for tax purposes and for purposes 
of reporting proﬁ  ts in company ﬁ  nancial reports. Given the recent FASB 
change and the requirement for ﬁ  rms to “expense” options in their balance 
sheet, one would think that it may be easier to account for options in the 
national accounts.
4.3      Sources of Data on Stock Options
Along with the explosion in the past few decades in the use of stock 
options by ﬁ  rms in the United States, there has been a dramatic increase in 
research on employee stock options. In this section, we provide a general 
review of data sources on stock options and how these data can be useful 
for answering diﬀerent questions about their incentive eﬀects, their value to 
ﬁ  rms and employees, and data that could potentially be useful in the treat-
ment of stock options in the national accounts. We will also try to address 
whether there are gaps in the set of data sources.
4.3.1      General Review of Sources of Data and 
How They Can Help Answer Questions
We have categorized the types of data on stock options into seven types: 
(a) commercial executive-  level and ﬁ  rm-  level sources, (b) individual ﬁ  rm 
ﬁ  nancial records at the ﬁ  rm level, (c) individual ﬁ  rm ﬁ  nancial records at the 
person level, (d) consulting ﬁ  rm data, (e) employee perception data from 
surveys, (f) government and nonproﬁ  t sources, and (g) international sources. 
Table 4.1 outlines the data and lists a set of sources that have used each. The 
set of sources listed in table 4.1 is by no means exhaustive. In each section, 
we brieﬂ  y describe the types of data and mention ways that the data have 
been or could be used.
4.3.2      Commercial Executive-  Level and Firm-  Level Data Sources
There are at least three available commercial data sources on executive 
pay at the person level and ﬁ  rm level that are now relatively widely used. 
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Standard and Poor’s Corporation and is likely the most widely used source 
of data for research on executive pay, including stock options. This source 
has available data from 1992—present on the compensation of the top-  ﬁ  ve 
highest paid employees of U.S. publicly traded ﬁ  rms who have managerial 
control in roughly 1,500 ﬁ  rms per year. These ﬁ  rms include those listed in 
the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500, the S&P SmallCap 600, and the S&P 
MidCap 400. The data source starts in 1992, which was (until four years 
ago) the last major change in executive pay disclosure rules. A wide variety 
of questions can be answered with these data including issues of pay for 
performance for corporate managers, studies of corporate ownership, and 
research on the composition (salary, bonus, options, stock, etc.) of executive 
pay. This data set is perhaps the most popular among academic researchers. 
Examples of work using these data that are mentioned in table 4.1 include 
Bergman and Jenter (2007), who examine employee optimism; Chidam-
baran and Nagpurnanand (2003), who study repricings; and Mehran and 
Tracy (2001), who provide a summary of some executive pay research using 
data from ExecuComp.
Two other commercial executive pay sources are Equilar and salary.com. 
Each also provides comprehensive data sets of executive compensation but 
have a larger focus on marketing to the for-  proﬁ  t ﬁ  rm and compensation 
consulting market. These sources are frequently used by compensation 
design practitioners and consultants to help design executive pay plans (and 
to set comparison groups), including detailed equity and employee stock 
option plans.
One problem with all three of these sources is that they only focus on the 
most senior executives with managerial control over the ﬁ  rm. If one is inter-
ested in the compensation of any employee who is not in the top- ﬁ  ve highest 
paid, these data sources are not particularly useful. They do, however, reveal 
the fraction of options given to the sum of the top- ﬁ  ve highest- paid oﬃcers 
so that one can calculate the fraction granted to the rest of the employees 
in the ﬁ  rm. Another drawback of these data is that they only cover publicly 
traded ﬁ  rms. Finally, ExecuComp is for a limited set of ﬁ  rms. Data from 
Equilar and salary.com are more expensive but include information from a 
wider variety of ﬁ  rms.
4.3.3      Individual Firm Financial Records (Firm Level)
A host of scholars have also considered ﬁ  rm ﬁ  nancial records at the ﬁ  rm 
level but have not used the well-  known ExecuComp and related sources; 
rather, they have dug deeper for more unique sources of information. We will 
discuss a selection of these examples here. Examples of this include Aboody 
(1996), who used the National Automation Accounting Research System 
(NAARS) library on Lexis/  Nexis in 1988 in a study of the relationship 
between outstanding options and stock; Core and Guay (2001), who study 
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and exercises; and Carpenter (1998), who collected information on average 
time to exercise, stock prices at the time of exercise, and vesting periods 
using data from 10- Ks, proxies, and S- 8 forms (the option plan prospectus).
The latter is an example of a study that required the use of signiﬁ  cant 
“digging” beyond what was easily available in machine-  readable form. This 
kind of work is expensive and time consuming but can open doors to many 
interesting ﬁ  ndings.
4.3.4      Individual Firm Detailed Case Study Data (Person-  Level)
There have been an increasing number of individual ﬁ  rm case studies over 
the past decade that have greatly enriched our understanding of employee 
stock options. Although these kinds of studies have the obvious drawback 
that the results may apply to one (or a small number of) ﬁ  rm(s), they are 
often extraordinarily rich in detail about the ﬁ  rm and individual. Too often, 
economic and ﬁ  nancial scholars are interested in discovering things such as 
the “incentive eﬀects” of a particular pay policy. In fact, the viability of a 
particular pay plan may depend quite a bit on the type of workers the ﬁ  rm 
employs and the strategy and objectives of the ﬁ  rm. That is to say, a particu-
lar pay practice may work more eﬀectively in one ﬁ  rm than another, even 
when ﬁ  rms are in similar industries and employ observably similar workers.
Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2006) study “option- exercise- timing- 
adjusted” employee option valuation models using detailed data from ten 
publicly traded U.S. ﬁ  rms including information on strike price, maximum 
term, and vesting schedule for each option grant to each employee. Their 
sample includes several tens of thousands of options. In some of our own 
work (Hallock and Olson 2007a,b), we examine data from two separate 
ﬁ  rms to consider the value of options to employees and employees’ choice 
of mix of pay. Two very important and early papers that use unique data 
from ﬁ  rms are Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) and Huddart and Lang 
(1996). The authors use individual-  by-  individual option grant and exercise 
data from 50,000 individuals at seven corporations. Bajaj et al. (2006) use 
data from two ﬁ  rms to consider the valuation of employee stock options and 
ﬁ  nd that employee stock option valuation methods suggested by Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R, such as adjusting the expected life of the 
employee stock options and making adjustments to the Black- Scholes value, 
lead to substantial biases in option valuation.
Again, each of these papers makes a unique contribution and shows the 
details that can be learned from extraordinarily speciﬁ  c data. However, each 
study also suﬀers from the drawback that they are studying a very small 
nonrandom sample of ﬁ  rms.
4.3.5    Consulting  Firm  Data
An increasing number of scholars have made connections with consulting 
ﬁ  rms to use data from a variety of ﬁ  rms at once in one study. These have the 
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fewer details than in some of the case studies previously discussed. Heron 
and Lie (2007) investigated whether stock option backdating explained price 
patterns around executive stock option grants. The authors use data on 
stock options grants from Thomson Financial, which collects information 
from insider transactions of stock and derivative grants and exercises from 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) forms 3, 4, 5, and 144. Lands-
man et al. (2006) consider which approach to accounting for stock options 
best reﬂ  ects market pricing. They use 1,354 ﬁ  rm-  year observations drawn 
from the S&P 500 from 1997 to 2001. Relationships with data providers are 
very hard to establish but the payoﬀ from such data collection can be great.
4.3.6      Employee Perception Data from Surveys
One way to estimate the value employees place on stock options is to ask 
employees. Farrell, Krische, and Sedatole (2006) use “conﬁ  dential training 
data ﬁ  les” of New Worth Strategies, Inc. (NWSI), a national leader in equity 
compensation planning services to investigate this issue. They examine how 
a training program may help employees understand their employee stock 
options better. Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) investigate individual 
perceptions of the value of stock options and restricted stock. This is an 
alternative to observing actual exercise behavior and is complementary to 
the work of others (including that described in section 4.4). A beneﬁ  t of this 
method is that the data are easily collected. A disadvantage is that respon-
dents may not take the questions as seriously as they would if they were 
faced with an actual ﬁ  nancial decision. The obvious problems with percep-
tion data still exist. It may be possible to try to elicit employee perception 
or utility by actually oﬀering them choice and observing their behavior. A 
recent example of this is Hallock and Olson (2007a).
4.3.7    Government  and  Nonproﬁ  t Sources
There are also a set of government and nonproﬁ  t data sources that 
contain diﬀerent types of information on employee stock options. Krou-
mova and Sesil (2006) consider the predictors of the use of employee stock 
option plans using data from the National Center for Employee Ownership 
(NCEO) in 1998 on 600 public and private ﬁ  rms sponsoring some form of 
broad-  based stock option plan merged with information from Compustat. 
Oyer and Schaefer (2005a, 2006) have two papers that use these types of 
sources. Other government sources on stock options include the data from 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) records that are used in calculating the na-
tional accounts and the 1999 special survey conducted by the NCS.
4.3.8    International  Data
Although the focus of this chapter is on employee stock options in the 
United States (and rules on grant, exercise, and taxation of options vary 
widely) international data on employee options are also available. Ikäheimo, 
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stock option companies (14 plans of 6 companies), which represents 98.7 
percent of total value of employee stock option trades on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HEX)” (353). In another study using Finnish data, Jones, Kalmi, 
and Makinen (2006) use ﬁ  rm-  level data on option plans from all Finnish 
ﬁ  rms from 1990 to 2002. Kato et al. (2005) investigate 644 adoptions of stock 
option plans announced by Japanese ﬁ  rms following the amendment of the 
Japanese commercial code in May 1997. Pendleton (2006) investigated the 
behavior of participants in the United Kingdom’s Save as You Earn (SAYE) 
stock option programs.
Data from diﬀerent countries certainly add to the richness of what we 
know about employee stock options. At the same time, we need to be careful 
in interpreting results across countries due to the quite diﬀerent reporting 
and tax rules on stock and employee stock options across country bound-
aries. These diﬀerences, of course, provide a potential source of exoge-
nous variation that can be used to understand the adoption of employee 
stock option plans and the behavior of ﬁ  rms and individuals covered by 
these plans. There is also substantial international interest in the national 
accounts measurement and timing issues we discussed previously, including 
as described in Lequiller (2002).
4.3.9      Gaps in the Set of Option Data and What to Do
Although there are many excellent data sources on stock options, there 
are signiﬁ  cant gaps. These include the diﬃculties with trying to gain access 
to ﬁ  rm ﬁ  nancial records, diﬃculty in collecting publicly available data, prob-
lems in reporting and understanding by individuals, and the issues of timing 
and measurement with the national accounts.
Many signiﬁ  cant advances in the literature on stock options have been 
made because of researcher access to data from individual ﬁ  rms or data 
from consulting companies. The obvious problem is that the ﬁ  rms may have 
little to “gain” by providing their data to researchers. In one of our recent 
experiences (Hallock and Olson 2007b), we were turned down by as many as 
ﬁ  ve companies (it could have been much worse) before we got access to the 
kinds of data we needed. In another (Hallock and Olson 2007a), we had a 
personal connection and an executive with a keen intellectual interest that 
helped us out. These types of data collection are very time consuming. In 
the end, we hope that ﬁ  rms will continue to share their data with researchers 
so more can be learned about options.
A second problem is that there are many publicly available data sources 
but the data are not yet “machine readable.” This is a substantial barrier 
to researchers. However, there have been considerable improvements in the 
kinds of data being collected. For example, all “Form 4” data on stock and 
option transactions by senior executives in publicly traded ﬁ  rms are posted 
on the SEC Web site, and commercial sources (such as Thomson Financial) 
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All is not bad news, however. An example is new requirements for ﬁ  rm 
reporting of executive pay packages. The changes in the recent proxy sea-
sons (relative to the years before) are extraordinary. Included among these 
changes is amazing detail on each individual option grant given to each indi-
vidual executive. These kinds of changes and easy to use machine-  readable 
sources will hopefully contribute to our further understanding of employee 
stock options.
4.4      Case Study of Employee Exercise Decisions
In this section, we investigate the value of options to employees using a 
case study of option exercise decisions by over 2,000 middle-  level mana-
gers and professionals in a large nonmanufacturing ﬁ  rm. The data we have 
include the entire ten-  year exercise history for a sample of employees in 
the ﬁ  rm holding options that were granted on a common set of exercise 
dates. All the options from a single grant had the same strike price, expired 
ten years from the grant date, and vested after two years.9 These common 
features mean that on each day in the ninety-  six month exercise window 
the same proﬁ  t could be earned by exercising an option from a common 
grant date, but the proﬁ  t varies from grant to grant because of diﬀerent 
exercise prices. Regardless of the option grant date, all option holders 
faced the same public information about the ﬁ  rm and the same exogenous 
macroeconomic environment on each calendar day in the exercise window. 
We also focused only on the exercise behavior of the 1,735 option holders 
who remained with the ﬁ  rm for the entire ten-  year term of the option. This 
largely eliminates heterogeneity in option valuation because of anticipated 
turnover.
Daily data on employee exercise decisions for one large option grant were 
aggregated into calendar months, and ﬁ  gure 4.3 shows the distribution of 
ﬁ  rst exercise times over the ninety-  six-  month exercise window. Evidence 
from this grant provides the strongest and simplest evidence of substan-
tial heterogeneity in the value of stock options to employees unrelated to 
turnover intentions. This ﬁ  gure shows options were exercised over almost 
the entire ninety-  six months with about 1 percent of the sample exercising 
options each month after about two years except for the ﬁ  nal months when 
exercise activity increased.
Is the variation in exercise time in ﬁ  gure 4.3 substantial? As noted earlier, 
if employees valued options based on Black- Scholes and they could sell their 
options, the distribution of exercise times would have a single mass point 
equal to 1.0 in month ninety- six; all the options would be exercised in month 
ninety-  six. Or, if employees identically valued options at another value, all 
9. Two- year vesting means the options could not be exercised until twenty- four months after 
the grant date.166        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
of the exercise activity would have occurred in another month. The data 
clearly reject the prediction of a single exercise date.
The variation in exercise times implies substantial heterogeneity in the 
value employees place on holding their options. What more can be said? 
First, the upward sloping dotted line and the right vertical scale in ﬁ  gure 
4.3 shows the proﬁ  t an employee could have made by exercising an option 
divided by the option’s BSV (i.e., [SPk –   EP]/  BSVT
t k, k   1, 2 . . . 96). This 
ratio approximates the portion of the option’s market value that is captured 
by exercising in any particular month rather than holding the option until 
the expiration date. One minus this ratio also indexes the penalty employees 
incur because they cannot sell their options. For example, for this option 
grant in month twenty, an employee lost about 30 percent of the option’s 
value by immediately exercising the option. The variation in the potential 
value of the option sacriﬁ  ced by “early” decisions indexes the substantial 
variation in the value of options to employees.
While much of the exercise activity summarized in ﬁ  gure 4.3 is “early” 
relative to what would be expected if employee stock options could be sold, 
the exercise pattern may be optimal for risk-  averse employees who cannot 
sell their options and who also have their careers, human capital, and retire-
ment income tied to the company. The diﬀerent value employees place on 
options with identical terms may reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in employee risk aver-
sion with the least risk-  averse employees holding options until the end of 
the exercise window. This hypothesis can be investigated by focusing on the 
18.3 percent of the sample in ﬁ  gure 4.3 that held their options until close to 
the end of the exercise window and exercised their options in months ninety- 
four, ninety-  ﬁ  ve, or ninety-  six. For this option grant, the intrinsic value of 
the option at the start of month ninety- four was about $240 per option, and 
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the average option holder owned about 200 options. Thus, almost 20 percent 
of the sample were willing to forego the $240 proﬁ  t per option at the start 
of month ninety- four for the opportunity to capture the expected gain from 
holding the option for, at most, an additional three months. What could 
employees expect to gain over this three-  month period, and what does their 
behavior imply about their risk aversion?
Assuming the stock price at the beginning of month ninety-  four equals 
$280, and the exercise price equals $40,10 the Black-  Scholes value of an 
option expiring in three months is $240.70 using reasonable values for the 
other Black-  Scholes parameters.11 Thus, a diversiﬁ  ed, risk-  neutral investor 
would be willing to hold their option for the remaining three months to col-
lect the expected gain of about $.70 per option or a return of 0.29 percent 
above what could be earned by immediately exercising the option.
The Black-  Scholes value of the option at the end of month ninety-  four 
can also be compared with the value from holding the option until month 
ninety- six for a risk- averse employee who predicts the ﬁ  rm’s stock price at the 
end of month ninety-  six using the ﬁ  rm’s expected risk adjusted return and 
the variance in these returns. Following the Hall and Murphy (2002) meth-
odology, the dollar value to a risk- averse employee from holding the option 
until the end of month ninety-  six is the certainty-  equivalent dollar value of 
the uncertain payoﬀs from holding the options another three months. In 
these calculations, we follow Hall and Murphy (2002) and deﬁ  ne the utility 
of w dollars to a risk-  averse employee to be (w(1–  RA))/  (1 –   RA), where RA is 
a risk aversion parameter.12 At the start of month ninety-  four, we assume 
the stock price at the end of month ninety-  six is deﬁ  ned by a stock return 
drawn from a normal distribution of annual returns (    .30) centered on 
the risk-  free return (6 percent) plus the risk premium investors expect to 
earn by holding this ﬁ  rm’s stock (14 percent).13 The utility function and the 
ending stock price distribution is used to calculate the certain cash payment 
employees would be willing to receive at the end of month ninety- three that 
would make these employees indiﬀerent between exercising the option and 
holding the option until the expiration day. Because the average number 
of options or grants that employees received in our sample is about 200, 
the certainty-  equivalent values were calculated by assuming an employee 
10. Again, we do not report the precise values because we are unable to disclose the name of 
the ﬁ  rm. The stock and exercise prices are the prices unadjusted for stock splits that occurred 
after the option grant date. Therefore, these calculations show the payoﬀ from exercising one 
of the original options that were granted to the employee and not an option that reﬂ  ects the 
eﬀects of the stock splits.
11. This assumes the short-  term risk-  free interest rate equals 6 percent per year and the 
standard deviation of yearly ﬁ  rm returns equals .30. These numbers are roughly representative 
of the ﬁ  rm and time period for this option grant.
12. If RA   1, then U(w)   ln(w).
13. The certainty-  equivalent values are computed by approximating the log-  normal price 
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was deciding when to exercise 200 options in the ﬁ  nal three months of the 
option’s term.
Table 4.2 shows the results from this exercise for diﬀerent levels of risk 
aversion. The ﬁ  rst row of numbers are based on the Black-  Scholes model 
and report the expected value of the options at the end of month ninety-  six 
assuming risk-  free returns are earned on the options. These calculations 
give a value of $244.23 per option or $48,846 for 200 options. Discounting 
this value back to the end of month ninety-  three gives the BSV of $48,140 
in column two. The remaining rows of the table give the certainty equiva-
lent values for diﬀerent levels of risk aversion where the ﬁ  nal stock price is 
based on a draw from an annual return distribution centered on the ﬁ  rm’s 
expected risk-  adjusted return (N[.20, .32]). The second row reports the risk- 
neutral evaluation of the options. This value is greater than the BSV in row 
one because the BSV assumes market traded options earn an expected rate 
of return equal to the risk-  free interest rate (6 percent), while an employee 
owning an option that cannot be sold predicts the ﬁ  rm’s stock price will 
increase at an expected rate that includes the ﬁ  rm’s risk premium (.06   
.14). For the risk-  neutral employee, this diﬀerence produces an expected 
gain larger than the BSV. For a risk- neutral employee, the dollar value at the 
end of month ninety- three of holding the option until the expiration date is 
$50,136. This risk-  neutral employee would hold their options because this 
value is greater than the $48,000 proﬁ  t that could be earned by exercising 
the options at the end of month ninety- three. The value at the end of month 
ninety-  three of holding the options until the expiration date is also almost 
$2,000 greater than the BSV of $48,140 for market traded options. This ex-
ample illustrates the point that risk- neutral employees could value employee 
Table 4.2  Certainty equivalent dollar values of 200 three-  month options with an 
exercise price of $40 and a current stock price of $280
     
Assuming no 
discounting ($) 
Discounted at risk-  free 
interest rate ($)  
Black- Scholes  value 48,846.40 48,140.00
Certainty-  equivalent values
Risk aversion parametera
  Risk-  neutral 50,871.20 50,135.60
  1.0 50,107.60 49,383.00
  1.5 49,727.60 49,008.60
  2.0 49,348.80 48,635.20
  2.5 48,971.20 48,263.00
  3.0 48,594.80 47,892.00
    3.5   48,219.60   47,522.20  
Note: The risk-  neutral interest rate is 6 percent, the ﬁ  rm’s risk premium is 14 percent, and the 
standard deviation of ﬁ  rm returns is .30.
aU(x)   W (1- RA)/(1-  RA) for RA   1 and U(x) ln(x) for RA   1.New Data for Answering Old Questions    1 6 9
stock options at more than their BSV even when they are prohibited from 
selling their options.
Economists generally believe that individuals are risk averse, and there is 
no reason to believe the midlevel managers and professionals in this sample 
have diﬀerent preferences. Therefore, the remaining rows in table 4.2 report 
more plausible certainty equivalent values for diﬀerent levels of risk aver-
sion. Hall and Murphy’s evaluation of past research leads them to conclude 
that a risk-  aversion parameter between two and three is a reasonable range 
for senior executives who are substantially wealthier than the sample of 
employees included in this analysis. The third row of table 4.2 shows that 
for a risk aversion parameter of 1.0, the certainty-  equivalent value at the 
end of month ninety-  three for the 200 options is $49,383, or $1,383 more 
than the $48,000 proﬁ  t that could be earned by immediately exercising the 
options. The remaining rows show the certainty equivalents for other levels 
of risk aversion. At RA equal to 2.0, the value at the end of month ninety- 
three of holding these options to the end of month ninety-  six is $635 more 
than the proﬁ  t earned by immediately exercising them. When RA equals 3.0, 
the certainty equivalent value is $47,892, or $108 less than the value from 
immediately exercising the options. Rational option holders who have a 
value of risk aversion of 3.0 would be expected to exercise their 200 options 
at the end of month ninety-  three. A risk-  aversion parameter of 2.85 gives a 
certainty-  equivalent value exactly equal to $48,000. Thus, individuals less 
risk averse than this value are predicted to hold their options, and those more 
risk averse are predicted to exercise their options. Because almost 20 percent 
of the sample held their options into month ninety-  four, these calculations 
suggest a substantial minority of individuals owning options from this grant 
had a risk aversion parameter less than 2.85.
The calculations in table 4.2 show that moderately risk averse employees 
could form rational expectations about the ﬁ  rm’s future stock price, decide 
to hold their options past the 93rd month, and place a value on the options 
greater than the options’ BSV. Employee valuation of options that exceed 
the option’s BSV and could not be sustained if employees could sell their 
options. If employees holding options at the end of month ninety-  three 
with a risk-  aversion parameter   2.8 were allowed to sell their options, 
they would discover they had overvalued their options because the mar-
ket would pay no more than the BSV. This leads to the prediction that the 
heterogeneity in valuations implied by the dispersed exercise times in ﬁ  gure 
4.3 would disappear if options were tradable because employee valuations 
would converge to the BSV. When employees cannot sell their options, their 
valuations can exceed BSV because they cannot observe market prices for 
options with comparably long terms (ten years), and they can’t borrow 
money from a bank using the options as collateral. Market information on 
options with terms comparable to employee stock options or borrowing 
terms from lenders might cause employees to value options closer to BSV. 170        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
Because employees lack these market signals, these calculations and their 
exercise behavior suggest they overvalue employee stock options compared 
to the BSV because they forecast the ﬁ  rm’s future stock price distribution 
using the observed, risk-  adjusted return earned by the ﬁ  rm’s shareholders 
and not the risk-  free return earned by owners of market traded options. 
Firms, of course, don’t allow employees to sell their options or use them as 
collateral because they want employees to hold the options to encourage 
worker commitment to the ﬁ  rm and its objectives.
4.4.1      Inferring the Value of Options to Employees 
from Their Exercise Decisions
The basic ideas used to construct table 4.2 can be used in a statistical anal-
ysis of the exercise behavior for the entire sample of employees. This analysis 
can provide an estimate of employee risk aversion and the value of stock 
options to employees. We deﬁ  ne the Employee Value Function (EVFk,j,t) to 
be equal the value or utility (in dollars) to person j in month t from holding 
an option from grant k another time period t measures the months since the 
option vested and ranges from one to ninety-  six because we study ten-  year 
option grants with a two-  year vesting period. In each month after vesting, 
we assume the employee decides between holding the option another period 
or exercising the option by comparing the proﬁ  t from exercising the option 
(the intrinsic value) with the value of holding the option at least another 
period. Because the stock price minus the exercise price equals the certain 
cash payment the employee receives from exercising the option, the option 
will be exercised if this cash payment is greater than the monetary value to 
the employee of holding the option. In other words, the option is exercised 
in month t if
(1) (SPt   EPk,j)   EVFk,j,t
and the option is held another period if
(1 ) (SPt   EPk,j)   EVFk,j,t.
The left side of equation (1) is observed and equals the intrinsic value of the 
option or the proﬁ  t that is made by exercising the option in month t. The 
key parameter we wish to estimate is the risk- aversion parameter employees 
use to discount the uncertain future payoﬀs from holding the option. Thus, 
the variable we focus on is the certainty equivalent value from holding the 
option implied by diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. The model underlying the 
calculations in table 4.2 imply an option is held another period if
(1″) (SPt   EPk,j)   CE[RA, f(SP96   EPk,j), rft, rmt,  2]k,j,t,
where CE(.) is the certainty-  equivalent value of holding the option until it 
expires. This depends on risk aversion (RA), the distribution of the option’s 
intrinsic value on the option’s expiration date, the risk-  free interest rate 
(rft), the ﬁ  rm’s risk premium (rmt), and the variance in the ﬁ  rm’s returns New Data for Answering Old Questions    1 7 1
( t
2). Equation (1″) could form the basis for estimating a probit model of 
employee exercise decisions. However, experimentation with diﬀerent empir-
ical speciﬁ  cations showed that this model ﬁ  ts the data poorly compared to 
speciﬁ  cations that included other covariates. Therefore, the estimates we 
report are based on a model where the probability an option is exercised in 
period t equals
(2) Pr(Exercised  in  t)   Pr(SPt   EPk,j)    0 
     1CE[RA, f(SP96   EPk,j), rft, rmt,  2]k,j,t 
    XC   vk,j,t, where vk,j,t ~ N(0, v
2).
The variables included in the X matrix included a set of dummy variables 
indicating whether period t was within two months of a stock split, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the stock price surpassed the high price in the 
past twelve months, the diﬀerential between the stock price in month t and 
the high price in the previous twelve months, and average ﬁ  rm returns in 
the previous three months and the next six months. Using data from all the 
option grants in the data set and not just the one grant used in table 4.2 per-
mits us to estimate a random eﬀects probit model because most individuals 
in the sample held options from grants made on diﬀerent dates in the early 
to mid 1990s.
One other problem had to be addressed before the exercise decision model 
described by equation (2) could be estimated using standard statistical soft-
ware. The certainty-  equivalent value of holding the option until expira-
tion is a nonlinear combination of the parameter RA and the variables 
f(SP96,i –  EPk,j), rft, rmt and  t
2. Using the utility function described in the pre-
ceding, the certainty-  equivalent value of holding the option until it expires 
equals exp[1/  (1 –   RA)   ln(E(utility of holding option until expiration)  
(1 –   RA))] discounted to the current period (t) at the risk-  free interest 
rate. The E(utility of holding option until expiration) ~ Σf(SP96,i –   EPk,j) 
U(SP96,i –   EPk,j), where f(SP96,i –   EPk,j) is calculated from a discrete esti-
mate of the log-  normal stock price distribution at the end of month 
ninety-  six using a twenty-  step binomial price tree and U(SP96,i –   EPk,j)   
(SP96,i –   EPk,j)(1– RA)/  (1 –   RA). These steps mean RA cannot be directly esti-
mated in a standard linear-  in-  the-  parameters probit or linear probability 
model of exercise decisions because CE(.) is a highly nonlinear function of 
the risk aversion parameter we wish to estimate. Therefore, we estimate the 
risk-  aversion parameter indirectly by selecting diﬀerent values of RA and 
then calculate the certainty-  equivalent values implied by each risk aversion 
value for each observation in the data. A random eﬀects probit model was 
then ﬁ  t for each risk aversion value and the log- likelihood values for models 
computed using diﬀerent values of RA were compared. The risk-  aversion 
value that best ﬁ  ts the exercise decisions comes from the model with the 
maximum log-  likelihood value.
Before describing the results, we brieﬂ  y describe the sample and data. We 172        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
have data for a sample of 2,180 middle managers and professionals who 
received multiple option grants at diﬀerent exercise prices and at diﬀerent 
points in calendar time from the studied ﬁ  rm. The ﬁ  rm is a large, long- 
established ﬁ  rm outside of manufacturing that has many tens of thousands 
of employees, billions of dollars in sales, and locations throughout the 
United States.14 The employees in the sample received options at thirteen 
diﬀerent exercise prices on thirteen diﬀerent days in the 1990s with the major-
ity of the grants occurring on two calendar dates where one exercise price 
was almost twice the magnitude of the other exercise price.15 The research 
summarized here uses data on the exercise decisions made by employees 
for options received in the ﬁ  rst two grants an employee participated in dur-
ing the 1990s, where the options from the grants had vested before the fall 
of 2003.
Table 4.3 contains descriptive statistics on the sample of option grants. A 
total of 3,712 options grants were received by the 2,180 employees, and all 
but 1,127 of these grants were exercised during the study period (e.g., were 
not right-  censored). Twenty-  ﬁ  ve percent of the grants are exercised by the 
34th month following vesting, the median exercise time is sixty- nine months 
and the 75th percentile of the exercise distribution is ninety months. The 
exercise hazard rate is relatively low and stable during the ﬁ  rst seventy-  two 
months and then increases sharply in the ﬁ  nal year as unexercised options 
are exercised before they expire. Consistent with the results for the one grant 
shown in ﬁ  gure 4.3, over the ﬁ  rst seventy- two months of the exercise window, 
an average of 1.11 percent of unexercised option grants were exercised for 
the ﬁ  rst time in each month.
An interesting feature of the experience in this ﬁ  rm is that not all options 
from a grant were exercised in the same month. In about 42 percent of the 
option grants where we observe the ﬁ  rst exercise date (e.g., the exercise time 
is not right- censored), the employee did not exercise all of the options in the 
grant. On the other hand, overall 77 percent of the total options from the 
grants were exercised by employees on their ﬁ  rst exercise date for a grant. 
For this reason only, the time until the ﬁ  rst option from a grant is exercised 
is analyzed.
A ﬁ  nal important feature of the sample is that it excludes managers who 
joined the ﬁ  rm during the 1990s or managers who received options during 
the 1990s but left the ﬁ  rm before the fall of 2003. Thus, these results describe 
the exercise decisions of long-  tenured, stable employees who did not exer-
cise options in anticipation of leaving the ﬁ  rm. Excluding option recipients 
who left the ﬁ  rm during the study period simpliﬁ  es the analysis because 
14. A condition for obtaining data from the ﬁ  rm included a promise that we would not reveal 
the identity of the ﬁ  rm. Therefore, we cannot provide a more detailed description of the ﬁ  rm 
or make the data available to other researchers.
15. In all cases, the options were granted “at the money.” That is, the exercise price was equal 
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we don’t have to jointly model employee turnover and option exercise 
decisions.16
4.4.2      Estimates of Employee Risk Aversion
Table 4.4 reports the log-  likelihood values for models that include the 
certainty-  equivalent values of holding an option calculated from diﬀerent 
risk- aversion values. For each RA value, the log- likelihood values are shown 
for two models; one model that includes only CE(.) and the option’s intrinsic 
value and a second model that also includes the other covariates.17 Across 
all the values of RA, a comparison of the likelihood values for the two 
speciﬁ  cations show the model that includes CE(.) and the other covariates 
does a much better job of predicting exercise decisions than a model with 
just CE(.) and the option’s intrinsic value. Therefore, the discussion focuses 
on the results in the second column of table 4.4.
The results in column (2) show a clear pattern. For the values shown in 
the table, the log-  likelihood value is maximized at –  12,409.44 in the model 
where RA equals 2.20 and deviations from 2.20 in either direction produce 
results with smaller log- likelihood values. Additional models were estimated 
for RA values around 2.20, and a RA value of 2.21 produced a maximum 
log-  likelihood value of –  12,409.437. This method of inferring RA does 
not produce an estimated standard error. Note, however, the risk-  neutral 
speciﬁ  cation implies RA   0, and for this model the log likelihood value is 
– 12,455.24. A likelihood ratio test comparing RA   0 and RA   2.21 clearly 
rejects the hypothesis that these employees were risk neutral in their option 
Table 4.3  Summary statistics on exercise decisions
No. of employees receiving options 2,180
No. of option grants 3,712
No. of option grants where time to ﬁ  rst exercise date is censored 1,127
Mean options/grant 1,302
Mean hazard rate/month 0.0128
25th percentile of time to ﬁ  rst exercise date (months) 34
Median time to ﬁ  rst exercise date (months) 69
75th percentile of time to ﬁ  rst exercise date (months) 90
Options exercised on ﬁ  rst exercise date as fraction of options in the grant 0.765
Fraction of ﬁ  rst exercise decisions where 100% of options in grant were exercised  0.576
16. Firms often report that they provide options to improve employee retention. Model-
ing option exercise decisions and turnover is diﬃcult. While options might reduce turnover, 
employees that are planning to leave the ﬁ  rm can be expected to exercise vested options before 
their departure. This creates a positive correlation between exercise decisions and the prob-
ability of turnover in the “near term.” Modeling exercise decisions and turnover behavior 
jointly would require a more elaborate competing risk framework and data on employees who 
did not receive options.
17. The log-  likelihood value for the model that includes the option’s intrinsic value and the 
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evaluations. In addition, the results are consistent with the model described 
by equation (2) because any of the speciﬁ  cations that include CE(.) ﬁ  t the 
data better than a model without CE(.) (logL   –  12,475.3).
The estimates summarized in the preceding imply all employees in the 
sample have identical risk preferences. This is unlikely to be true. Indeed, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion may be an important variable explaining the 
variability in exercise times observed in the data. One variable we have that 
may be negatively correlated with risk aversion is an employee’s earnings in 
the ﬁ  rm. Although this sample is a fairly homogeneous sample along earn-
ings relative to the earnings distribution for the entire ﬁ  rm or for the U.S. 
labor force, the variation in wages in the sample may be suﬃcient to identify 
variation in risk aversion.
The sample of employees was divided into wage quartiles based on real 
earnings in the ﬁ  rst month an option held by an individual vested. The 
empirical method used in the preceding for the entire sample was then rep-
licated for each subsample to identify the value of RA that maximized the 
log-  likelihood value for each subsample. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that lower-  wage workers are more risk averse than higher-  wage 
workers. For workers in the ﬁ  rst quartile, the best ﬁ  tting model had an RA 
value of 2.34; the value for the second quartile was 2.18; 2.15 for the third 
Table 4.4  Log-  likelihood values for models that include certainty-  equivalent values 
of holding an option for diﬀerent levels of risk aversion
Model includes:
  Risk aversion  Intrinsic value, CE(.)  Intrinsic value, CE(.), X  
Risk- neutral –12,488.67 –12,455.240
  0.50 –12,484.42 –12,452.822
  1.00 –12,473.70 –12,443.847
  1.50 –12,461.13 –12,433.029
  1.75 –12,451.98 –12,424.170
  2.00 –12,442.12 –12,413.851
  2.20 –12,437.94 –12,409.443
  2.25 –12,438.13 –12,409.661
  2.30 –12,438.95 –12,410.499
  2.50 –12,447.87 –12,419.073
  3.00 –12,487.56 –12,453.232
    3.50   –12,520.71   –12,475.175  
Notes: A model with just the option Intrinsic Value (IV) and the X variables has a log- 
likelihood value of –12,475.29. The six variables in the X matrix include the diﬀerential 
between the stock price in the month and the twelve-  month stock price high, the average ﬁ  rm 
stock return over the previous three months, the average stock return over the next six months, 
and separate dummy variables indicating whether the stock price in the month exceeds the 
twelve- month price high, and indicators for two months prior to a stock split and two months 
after a stock split. The log- likelihood value is maximized (–12,409.437) for a model where RA 
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quartile; and 2.09 for the highest wage quartile. Although we cannot sta-
tistically test whether these values are diﬀerent from one another, the point 
estimates suggest variation in risk aversion in the predicted direction.
The values of RA for models that best predict exercise decisions for the 
entire sample and each wage quartile can be used to calculate the certainty- 
equivalent value to an employee of holding an option until the expiration 
date. These option values to employees can be compared to the value the 
market would place on the same options using Black-  Scholes. Figure 4.4 
shows these values for thirty- six to eighty- four months after the option vests 
for a ten-  year option with an exercise price of $15 and a current stock price 
of $50. The ﬁ  gure shows BSV and the certainty-  equivalent values of the 
option for RA   2.34, 2.21, and 2.09. As expected, the uncertain payoﬀ 
from holding the option means the option’s value declines as risk aversion 
increases. For example, at sixty months after vesting or seven years since the 
option was received, the value of holding the option is $38.61 when RA   
2.34, $41.14 when RA   2.21, and $43.41 when RA   2.09.
The other key point shown in this ﬁ  gure is that for these three risk- aversion 
parameters, an employee places a higher value on holding the option than 
what Black-  Scholes predicts the option could be sold for in the market. As 
discussed earlier, this ﬁ  nding supports the point made from table 4.2 that 
the exercise behavior of these employees implies they value their options 
at values in excess of the option’s BSV because of fundamental diﬀerences 
Fig. 4.4    Certainty equivalent and Black-  Scholes values 36–  84 months after vesting 
for a 10-  year option where SP  50, EP  15
Notes: Expected ﬁ  rm return   .2, risk free return   .06, SD returns   .3. Each period the 
certainty equivalent (CE) values are computed from a terminal stock price distribution esti-
mated from a forty- step binomial price tree. See text for description of the utility function. The 
CE lines are smoothed estimates through the CE values. SP   stock price. EP   exercise price.176        Kevin F. Hallock and Craig A. Olson
between employee stock options and market traded options. Because 
employees cannot sell their options or use them as collateral to borrow 
money, they have no market signals to evaluate their worth to outside inves-
tors. The estimates suggest that employees value their options based on the 
ﬁ  rm’s expected returns rather than the risk-  free return the market uses to 
value options. The constraints that prohibit employees from selling their 
options or using them as collateral are imposed by the ﬁ  rm to further the 
ﬁ  rm’s objectives. For senior managers who have substantial impact on the 
success of the ﬁ  rm, these features encourage executives to hold onto their 
options and make decisions that are beneﬁ  cial to shareholders. In the ﬁ  rm 
studied here, the employees are not at a suﬃciently high level in the ﬁ  rm 
to individually have a large impact on proﬁ  tability. However, the ﬁ  rm may 
gain a more committed management workforce by providing options and 
encouraging employees to hold on to them.
This section focuses on how employee exercise decisions can be used 
to infer the risk aversion of employees and the value employees place on 
employee stock options. These results have implications for many of the 
research and policy questions summarized in earlier sections of the chapter. 
For example, the cost of options to the ﬁ  rm depend on when employees exer-
cise their options and the sensitivity of their exercise decisions to changes in 
the ﬁ  rm’s stock price. Using Black-  Scholes to cost options assumes options 
are held until the expiration date and the stock price at expiration is drawn 
from a log- normal distribution. Because these assumptions do not describe 
the option grants studied here, the BSV provides a poor estimate of the cost 
of these options to the ﬁ  rm. However, the empirical model of exercise deci-
sions estimated here can be used to predict when employees exercise their 
options and the sensitivity of their exercise decisions to the ﬁ  rm’s stock price.
4.5      Open Questions and Conclusion
In the past few years, there have been dramatic shifts in public perceptions 
of and government regulations over how executives and other employees 
are paid in the United States. Until just recently, ﬁ  rms in the United States 
were not required to “expense” stock options in their balance sheets. Now 
that U.S. ﬁ  rms have to report options as an expense in the balance sheet and 
not just in footnotes to ﬁ  nancial statements, decisions to grant options to 
employees are likely to be subject to greater scrutiny. While much has been 
learned about employee stock options over the past ten to ﬁ  fteen years, 
numerous issues important to ﬁ  rms, policymakers, and employees remain 
unresolved. In this chapter, we highlight some of these issues, discuss recent 
policy shifts aﬀecting options, and summarize the data sources on options 
available in the United States and elsewhere. In the last section, we present 
some of our own work on options that explore the value employees place 
on options that, in turn, has implications for the cost of options to the ﬁ  rm.New Data for Answering Old Questions    1 7 7
There are several new and continuing regulatory issues on the horizon 
that deal with compensation and stock options. One that is interesting is 
the way that ﬁ  rms have been required to report on executive compensation. 
Even though there has been considerable reform, there is still confusion 
about the way ﬁ  rms report options in the “summary compensation table.” 
Firms are given wide leeway in the assumptions they can make about certain 
forms of compensation and how they report. We anticipate more reforms 
and changes along these lines in the future.
Another is how to explicitly deal with employee stock options in the na-
tional accounts. As is it today, ISOs are not counted at all and the much 
more prevalent NSOs are, but as discussed previously, there are considerable 
problems with how and when these data are reported. Recent attempts by 
the BEA to examine this have been fruitful, but there are still unresolved 
conceptual and data issues to be addressed.
There is a series of other interesting questions on options where some 
progress has been made but more is to be done. Some of these questions 
have been answered, but many have solutions that are not yet known. The 
questions include why do ﬁ  rms grant options (Hall and Murphy 2003), do 
options retain employees (Hall and Murphy 2003), do they motivate employ-
ees (Hall and Murphy 2003), do they attract employees (Oyer and Schafer 
2005b), why are they granted (in some cases) throughout the ﬁ  rm (Oyer and 
Schafer 2005b), will the recent FASB changes alter the way employees are 
paid (Bodie, Kalpan, and Merton 2003), how well do options work, why 
don’t more ﬁ  rms use indexed options (e.g., relative performance evaluation 
work by Antle and Smith 1986; and Gibbons and Murphy 1990), are options 
eﬃcient, what is the value employees place on options (Hall and Murphy 
2003; Hallock and Olson 2007b), what is the cost of options to the ﬁ  rm (Hal-
lock and Olson 2007b), and what are issues surrounding options backdating 
(Lie 2005, 2007; Yermack 1997)?
New work on stock options has the potential to have a practical impact 
on ﬁ  rms and the national accounts. If ﬁ  rms do not have a credible estimate 
of how employees value stock options or other forms of compensation and 
ﬁ  rms alter the mix of pay, there could be consequences related to employee 
attraction, retention, and turnover and problems reconciling the national 
accounts. We hope that our work is a useful step in the right direction of 
understanding more about compensation and employee stock options.
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Comment  Chris Riddell
Stock options and, in particular, equity awards broadly deﬁ  ned, remain 
an area with many unanswered questions. Why do companies use stock 
options (or other equity awards)? do they motivate employees; lead to 
greater retention? What value do employees place on equity awards? We still 
know relatively little about these fundamental questions. Further, in light 
of recent changes in accounting practices for stock options where ﬁ  rms are 
now required to recognize compensation expense at the time of the grant, 
as well as international generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
standards likely coming to the United States, there are many policy issues 
still to be addressed such as what types of option pricing models may or 
should be mandated in the future.
A key reason why our knowledge is so limited in the area of equity com-
pensation is data availability: to think deeply about issues such as those in the 
preceding, we require detailed information on the contractual parameters of 
a stock grant coupled with personnel records for a reasonable time period 
(e.g., long enough to examine such behavior as turnover or exercising and 
so forth). Locating such data is, unfortunately, far from straightforward! 
Hallock and Olson have done an admirable job in ﬁ  nding several sources 
of such data resulting in a series of exciting papers (also see Hallock and 
Olson 2007a,b).
In this chapter, the authors focus primarily on how employees value stock 
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